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A DISCOURAGING OMEN: A CRITICAL
EVALUATION OF THE APPROVED UNIFORM
LANGUAGE FOR TESTIMONY AND REPORTS
FOR THE FORENSIC LATENT PRINT DISCIPLINE
Simon A. Cole*
The theme of the 2018 Georgia State University Law Review
symposium is the Future of Forensic Science Reform. In this Article,
I will assess the prospects for reform through a critical evaluation of
a document published in February 2018 by the United States
Department of Justice (DOJ), the Approved Uniform Language for
Testimony and Reports for the Forensic Latent Print Discipline
(ULTR).1 I argue that this document provides reason to be concerned
about the prospects of forensic science reform. In Part I, I discuss the
background of the ULTR. In Part II, I undertake a critical evaluation
of the ULTR. In the Conclusion, I discuss why the importance of the
ULTR extends beyond merely one document and one discipline to
implicate the future of forensic science reform more generally.
I. Background
A. ULTRs
To understand the rationale for treating a single three-page
document as a measure of the prospects for forensic reform, some
background will be useful. The lack of standardization in forensic
testimony and reporting has been an issue of consternation for some

* Professor of Criminology, Law & Society, University of California, Irvine; Ph.D. (science &
technology studies), Cornell University; A.B., Princeton University. This research was funded in part by
the Center for Statistical Applications in Forensic Evidence, sponsored by the National Institute of
Standards and Technology. The views expressed are the author’s and not those of the funders or anyone
mentioned below. The writing of this Article benefitted from conversations with Alex Biedermann,
Joelle Vuille, William Thompson, Nancy Rodriguez, Julia Leighton, and Sarah Chu.
1. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, APPROVED UNIFORM LANGUAGE FOR TESTIMONY AND REPORTS FOR THE
FORENSIC LATENT PRINT DISCIPLINE 1 (2018), https://www.justice.gov/file/1037171/download
[https://perma.cc/XGS9-95HE].
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time.2 This issue received official notice in 2009 when the National
Research Council included among its recommendations for
“strengthening forensic science in the United States” a
recommendation to “establish standard terminology to be used in
reporting on and testifying about the results of forensic science
investigations.” 3 A newly created institution, the Organization of
Scientific Area Committees (OSAC), sponsored by the National
Institute of Standards and Technology, is currently trying to write
standards for testimony and reporting in many forensic disciplines.4
However, no such standards have yet been approved.5
Another important development in this area that particularly
impacted the DOJ was the 2015 release of a report on reporting
practices by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in the
discipline of microscopic hair comparison (MHC). This report found
that MHC was reported in a misleading manner in a stunning 95% of
cases reviewed.6
Largely in response to the MHC review, in February 2016 the
Deputy Attorney General announced that the DOJ would develop
what would later become the ULTRs, but were then called
“Approved Scientific Standards for Testimony and Reports”
(ASSTRs), in many forensic disciplines. 7 Describing the ASSTRs,
the Deputy Attorney General said, “We hope this effort will serve as
a model for demonstrating our commitment to strengthening forensic
2. See, e.g., Bert Black, Focus on Science, Not Checklists, 39 TRIAL 24, 26 (2003).
3. NAT’L RES. COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE
UNITED STATES: A PATH FORWARD 22, 189 (2009).
4. OSAC Approved Standards, NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH. (Jan. 25, 2017),
https://www.nist.gov/topics/forensic-science/organization-scientific-area-committees-osac/osacregistry/osac-approved [https://perma.cc/M3GF-FZP4].
5. Id.
6. Spencer S. Hsu, FBI Admits Flaws in Hair Analysis Over Decades, WASH. POST (Apr. 18,
2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/crime/fbi-overstated-forensic-hair-matches-in-nearly-allcriminal-trials-for-decades/2015/04/18/39c8d8c6-e515-11e4-b510962fcfabc310_story.html?utm_term=.67f5806990fa [https://perma.cc/6EDQ-XGCP].
7. Sally Q. Yates, Deputy Att’y Gen., Remarks at the 68th Annual Scientific Meeting of the
American Academy of Forensic Science (Feb. 24, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/deputyattorney-general-sally-q-yates-delivers-remarks-during-68th-annual-scientific [https://perma.cc/4QLBABEZ] (“To address this problem [of testimonial overstatement revealed by the microscopic hair
comparison review], the FBI is close to finalizing new internal standards for testimony and reporting—
which they’re calling ‘Approved Scientific Standards for Testimony and Reports,’ or ASSTR.”).
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science, now and in the future.” 8 The first draft documents, now
renamed ULTRs, were published for public comment in June 2016.9
In April 2017, the U.S. Attorney General did not renew the
National Commission on Forensic Science (NCFS). 10 This was an
important development, because the NCFS had been created in 2013
“to provide recommendations and advice to the Department of
Justice concerning national methods and strategies for strengthening
the validity and reliability of the forensic sciences.”11 The Attorney
General replaced the NCFS with a Forensic Science Working
Group.12 In announcing this new position, the ULTRs were among
only two specific projects mentioned that the DOJ would pursue
“aimed at ensuring that the testimony of the Justice Department’s
forensic examiners is consistent with sound scientific principles and
just outcomes.” 13 This was significant because the entity charged
with producing the ULTRs is now also the entity charged with
regulating forensic science more generally in the United States. 14
Thus, to a far greater extent than before, the content of the ULTRs
and the process by which that content is produced will tell us a lot
about the future of the regulation of forensic science in the United
States.
8. Id.
9. Forensic Science, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, https://www.justice.gov/archives/dag/forensic-science
[https://perma.cc/TLK4-8GVS] (last visited Apr. 15, 2018) (archived webpage).
10. Spencer S. Hsu, Sessions Orders Justice Dept. to End Forensic Science Commission, Suspend
Review Policy, WASH. POST (Apr. 10, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/publicsafety/sessions-orders-justice-dept-to-end-forensic-science-commission-suspend-reviewpolicy/2017/04/10/2dada0ca-1c96-11e7-98871a5314b56a08_story.html?utm_term=.b4648d713d41 [https://perma.cc/2FVF-7GDH].
11. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, RENEWED CHARTER FOR THE NAT’L COMMISSION ON FORENSIC SCIENCE
(Apr. 23, 2015) https://www.justice.gov/archives/ncfs/file/624216/download [https://perma.cc/7SX9PPYN].
12. Beth Reinhard, Jeff Sessions Scuttles Forensics Partnership with Scientist, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 7,
2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/jeff-sessions-scuttles-forensics-partnership-with-scientists1502148688 [https://perma.cc/R75P-SPZ3]; Press Release No. 17-0880, Dep’t of Justice, Office of Pub.
Affairs, Justice Department Announces Plans to Advance Forensic Science (Aug. 7, 2017),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-announces-plans-advance-forensic-science
[https://perma.cc/W2ZD-Q9F4].
13. Press Release No. 17-0880, supra note 12.
14. OSAC also regulates forensic science in the United States, but OSAC’s mandate, which is
limited to setting standards, is much narrower than the NCFS’s mandate was. See Simon A. Cole, Who
Will Regulate American Forensic Science?, 48 SETON HALL L. REV. 563, 566 (2018).
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In 2018, at the annual meeting of the American Academy of
Forensic Science, Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein
announced the DOJ’s “plans to advance forensic science.” 15 In
fleshing out these “plans,” the DOJ’s press release listed four specific
actions.16 First among these was the publication of the ULTR for the
latent print discipline.17 As Rosenstein noted, the latent print ULTR
“is the first approved Uniform Language document.”18 So, again, this
first ULTR may tell us a lot about not only future ULTRs but also
about the future of forensic reform.
B. Latent Print Reporting
The reporting of the results of latent print analyses has been a
vexing issue for several decades now. Historically, for more than a
century, latent print analyses were generally reported in a rather
simple framework. A latent print could be deemed “of value” or
not.19 Comparing a latent print of value with a known print could
result in one of three reports: (1) identification; (2) inconclusive; (3)
exclusion.20 This framework is often described as categorical because
it sorts all reports into one of three clearly delineated categories,
which are treated as entirely distinct from one another, yet entirely
15. Press Release No. 18-213, Dep’t of Justice Office of Pub. Affairs, Justice Department
Announces Plans to Advance Forensic Science (Feb. 21, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justicedepartment-announces-plans-advance-forensic-science-0 [https://perma.cc/ZJ83-CJGY].
16. See id.
17. Id. The other three were: (1) a testimony monitoring framework; (2) plans (as yet unfulfilled) to
publish documents such as quality management documents and internal validation studies (and,
presumably, standard operating procedures); and (3) the rechartering of the Council of Federal Forensic
Laboratory Directors. Id. For more on standard operation procedures in the FBI’s Latent Print Unit, see
Simon A. Cole, Implementing Counter-Measures Against Confirmation Bias in Forensic Science, 2 J.
APPLIED RES. MEMORY & COGNITION 61, 61 (2013).
18. Rod J. Rosenstein, Deputy Att’y Gen., Remarks at the American Academy of Forensic Sciences
(Feb. 21, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/deputy-attorney-general-rosenstein-deliversremarks-american-academy-forensic-sciences [https://perma.cc/A2TP-DTRW].
19. Recently, this decision has been complicated by differences between laboratories, some of which
use an additional designation called “of value for exclusion only.” SCI. WORKING GRP. ON FRICTION
RIDGE ANALYSIS STUDY & TECH., STANDARDS FOR EXAMINING FRICTION RIDGE IMPRESSIONS AND
RESULTING CONCLUSIONS § 4.1.4.2 (Mar. 13, 2013), http://www.swgfast.org/documents/examinationsconclusions/130427_Examinations-Conclusions_2.0.pdf [https://perma.cc/QC8Y-J6EF] [hereinafter
SWGFAST]. This issue need not concern us here.
20. Allyson A. Simons, Technical Working Group on Friction Ridge Analysis, Study and
Technology (TWGFAST) Guidelines, 48 J. FORENSIC IDENTIFICATION 147, 147 (1998).
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homogeneous within. This categorical framework has been criticized
since at least the mid-1990s.21 To avoid excess detail, the criticism
can be summarized by two points.
First, categorical reporting is artificial and inferior to what might
be called continuous reporting, in which the weight of each
individual latent print comparison is described as it is assigned, rather
than by reference to its place in a relatively crude three-category
framework. Categorical reporting is vulnerable to the same criticism
that can be made of any use of categories: the artificial boundaries
between the categories render the system prone to perverse cliff
effects. Thus, a comparison about which the examiner is 100%
certain 22 is reported as identification, while a comparison about
which the same examiner is 99.9999% certain is reported as
inconclusive. Likewise, that 99.9999% certain result yields the exact
same report—inconclusive—as a report that is 51% certain, 1%
certain, or 0.1% certain.
The second criticism is that a categorical framework posits two
entire categories as the extremes of the continuum of probability:
identification is equivalent to a probability of one, and exclusion is
equivalent to a probability of zero. Put another way, categorical
reporting claims that certainty is possible. Indeed, under the
categorical framework, positive results—that is, results that claimed
an association between a latent print and a known print—could not
be reported in any way but certainty. Many viewed this as violating
what is sometimes called Cromwell’s rule, which holds that the
probability of an event is always between zero and one but can never
be equal to zero or one.23
Forensic statisticians, and those who are persuaded by them, argue
that categorical reporting frameworks distort forensic evidence by

21. Christophe Champod, Edmond Locard—Numerical Standards and ‘Probable’ Identifications, 45
J. FORENSIC IDENTIFICATION 139, 139 (1995). It is possible to argue that figures such as Edmond
Locard and Henry Faulds implicitly criticized the categorical framework in the early 20th century.
22. For purposes of illustration only, in this example I am assuming that claims to 100% certainty
are not incoherent on their face and that the examiner’s “certainty” is an appropriate way of reporting
the weight of evidence.
23. DENNIS V. LINDLEY, UNDERSTANDING UNCERTAINTY 91 (2006).
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both overvaluing and undervaluing forensic associations. 24 In the
case of the latent print framework, all identifications are overvalued
by the untenable claim to a probability of one, which amounts to
certainty. Many inconclusive outcomes are undervalued because they
are essentially deemed to mean nothing, even if there is a finding that
the two prints very, very likely derive from the same source.
In place of this, forensic statisticians propose what is sometimes
called a weight of evidence framework. In this framework, the
examiner would report the weight of the evidence as a ratio between
the probability of the evidence if the two prints derive from the same
source and the probability of the evidence if the two prints derive
from different sources. In such a framework, some value would
always be assigned to each probability; neither probability would be
assigned a value of zero.25
In 2015, the U.S. Defense Forensic Science Center (DFSC) began
reporting latent print results in a probabilistic format.26 The DFSC
explicitly stated that it would no longer use the term identification
because of its historical association with claims to certainty. 27 In
2015, the European Network of Forensic Science Institutes published
a guideline recommending that forensic scientists, including latent
print examiners, report their findings in the form of a likelihood
ratio.28

24. Cedric Neumann & Julian Champkin, Fingerprints at the Crime-Scene: Statistically Certain, or
Probable?, SIGNIFICANCE, Feb. 2012, at 21, 25.
25. See, e.g., Christophe Champod & Ian W. Evett, A Probabilistic Approach to Fingerprint
Evidence, 51 J. FORENSIC IDENTIFICATION 101, 101 (2001); Neumann & Champkin, supra note 24, at
21; Cedric Neumann, Statistics and Probabilities As a Means to Support Fingerprint Examination, in
LEE AND GAENSSLEN’S ADVANCES IN FINGERPRINT TECHNOLOGY 419, 452 (Robert Ramotowski ed.,
3d ed. 2013).
26. DEF. FORENSIC SCI. CTR., DEP’T OF THE ARMY, INFORMATION PAPER NO. CIFS-FSL-LP, USE OF
THE TERM “IDENTIFICATION” IN LATENT PRINT TECHNICAL REPORTS 1 (Nov. 3, 2015).
27. Id.
28. EUROPEAN NETWORK OF FORENSIC SCI. INSTS., ENFSI GUIDELINE FOR EVALUATIVE
REPORTING
IN
FORENSIC
SCIENCE
6
(Mar.
8,
2015),
http://enfsi.eu/wpcontent/uploads/2016/09/m1_guideline.pdf [https://perma.cc/N5ZN-TSYZ].
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C. The Draft ULTR for the Forensic Latent Print Discipline
In 2016, the DOJ published sixteen draft ULTRs with supporting
documentation for public comment. 29 Numerous public comments
were made. After the public comment period had closed, a committee
convened by the American Association for the Advancement of
Science (AAAS) wrote a 2017 report on latent print analysis.30 This
report considered and commented on the draft ULTR for the latent
print discipline. 31 The public comments and the AAAS report
criticized the latent print ULTR and its supporting documentation on
several grounds. Below I list the criticisms of the ULTR’s definition
of identification, which reads:
The examiner may state or imply that an identification is
the determination that two friction ridge prints originated
from the same source because there is sufficient quality and
quantity of corresponding information such that the
examiner would not expect to see that same arrangement of
features repeated in another source. While an identification
to the absolute exclusion of all others is not supported by
research, studies have shown that as more reliable features
are found in agreement, it becomes less likely to find that
same arrangement of features in a print from another
source.32
Some criticisms of this statement include the following:

29. Forensic Science, supra note 9.
30. WILLIAM THOMPSON ET AL., ASS’N FOR ADVANCEMENT OF SCI., FORENSIC SCIENCE
ASSESSMENTS: A QUALITY AND GAP ANALYSIS: LATENT FINGERPRINT EXAMINATION (2017),
https://mcmprodaaas.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fspublic/reports/Latent%20Fingerprint%20Report%20FINAL%209_14.pdf?i9xGS_EyMHnIPLG6INIUy
Zb66L5cLdlb [https://perma.cc/GPQ3-YAK4].
31. Id.
32. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PROPOSED UNIFORM LANGUAGE FOR TESTIMONY AND REPORTS FOR THE
FORENSIC LATENT PRINT DISCIPLINE 1 (June 3, 2016),
https://www.justice.gov/archives/olp/file/861911/download [https://perma.cc/JK63-PEAD].
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(1) A categorical scheme allowing only three possible
reports is too crude.33
(2) The definition is circular.34
(3) Replacing identification to the exclusion of all
others
(TTEOAO)
with
identification—or
“minc[ing]” the term identification 35 —makes no
scientific, logical, or linguistic difference and will
not make any difference to lay people. The term
identification should be replaced.36
(4) A claim of identification is inherently a decision. A
framework, known as decision theory, exists which
provides a roadmap to making an identification
decision. However, this framework is not used by
the ULTR. Moreover, the framework would require
the latent print examiner to have knowledge that is
beyond the expertise of a fingerprint examiner.37
33. Michele Triplett, Comment on Proposed Uniform Language for Testimony and Reports (June
17, 2016), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=DOJ-OLP-2016-0012-0018
[https://perma.cc/6PDY-KVXF].
34. Id.
35. THOMPSON ET AL., supra note 30, at 61.
36. Id. at 60; Simon A. Cole, Comment on Statements Approved for Use in Laboratory Reports by
Expert Witnesses (July 8, 2016), https://www.regulations.gov/contentStreamer?documentId=DOJ-OLP2016-0012-0085&attachmentNumber=1&contentType=pdf [https://perma.cc/53B8-L7UG]; Friction
Ridge Subcomm. of the Organization of Sci. Area Comms., Comment on Proposed Uniform Language
for Testimony and Reports for the Forensic Latent Print Discipline and Supporting Documentation (July
8, 2016), https://www.regulations.gov/contentStreamer?documentId=DOJ-OLP-2016-00120067&attachmentNumber=1&contentType=pdf [https://perma.cc/96N2-PG78]; Jessica Gabel Cino,
Comment on Proposed Uniform Language for Testimony and Reports (July 8, 2016),
https://www.regulations.gov/contentStreamer?documentId=DOJ-OLP-2016-00120102&attachmentNumber=1&contentType=pdf [https://perma.cc/BZX9-6XUP]; Innocence Project &
Innocence Network, Comment on Proposed Uniform Language for Testimony and Reports for the
Forensic Latent Print Discipline (July 11, 2016),
https://www.regulations.gov/contentStreamer?documentId=DOJ-OLP-2016-00120124&attachmentNumber=1&contentType=pdf [https://perma.cc/SP7L-H82L]; Jules Epstein, Comment
on the Proposed Uniform Language for Testimony and Reports (June 17, 2016),
https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=DOJ-OLP-2016-0012-0019 [https://perma.cc/4ZJZ-KZEB].
37. Simone Gittelson, Comment on Proposed Uniform Language for Forensic Latent Print
Discipline (July 11, 2016), https://www.regulations.gov/contentStreamer?documentId=DOJ-OLP-20160012-0138&attachmentNumber=1&contentType=pdf [https://perma.cc/MUF9-6FFV]; see also John
Buckleton et al., Comment on Proposed Uniform Language for the Forensic Footwear and Tire
Impression Discipline (July 5, 2016), https://www.regulations.gov/contentStreamer?documentId=DOJOLP-2016-0012-0052&attachmentNumber=1&contentType=pdf
[https://perma.cc/2XJM-WV54].
Specifically, the examiner would need to know: (1) the prior probability that the source of the known
print is the source of the latent print; and (2) “the utility (or loss) values of correctly identifying the
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(5) The definition of identification is ambiguous as to
whether it is intended to express certainty or
uncertainty. If it is intended to express certainty, it
violates Cromwell’s rule.38
(6) If the definition of identification is intended to
express uncertainty, hedging with the term expect
does not solve the problem.39
(7) There is no scientific support for the claim that
latent print examiners can tell when they are in a
situation in which they can distinguish same-source
and different-source pairings40—or, to put it another
way, that they can precisely estimate the rarity of
features observed in a latent print.41
questioned impression, correctly not identifying the questioned impression, incorrectly identifying the
questioned impression and incorrectly not identifying the questioned impression.” Gittelson, supra. For
more on this issue, see infra Part II.B.2.b)(1).
38. Cole, supra note 36; Friction Ridge Subcomm. of the Organization of Sci. Area Comms., supra
note 36; Cino, supra note 36; Epstein, supra note 36.
39. THOMPSON ET AL., supra note 30, at 62 (“We disagree . . . with the language that the DOJ
suggests that examiners use. In our view, the DOJ’s proposed language is . . . scientifically unwarranted.
Under the DOJ proposal examiners are forbidden from saying that the arrangement of features found in
a latent print and in a matching exemplar would not be repeated in another source, as that statement
would constitute the forbidden and unsupportable claim that the two friction ridge impressions
originated from the same source to the exclusion of all others. But examiners are allowed to say that
they ‘would not expect to see that same arrangement of features repeated in another source.’ Examiners
are thus allowed to make an assertion that is deemed scientifically unsupportable and improper so long
as they hedge by saying that they ‘expect’ that the assertion is true rather than saying outright that it is
true.”) (emphasis omitted). See also Letter from Rush D. Holt, Chief Exec. Officer, Am. Ass’n for the
Advancement of Sci., to Rod Rosenstein, Deputy Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice (Mar. 26, 2018)
(on file with Georgia State University Law Review).
40. Cole, supra note 36 (“There is no scientific support for the claim that any method of latent print
analysis . . . enables . . . a latent print examiner . . . to ascertain that the amount of corresponding friction
ridge features that they perceive always derive from same-source pairings and never derive from
different-source pairings.”).
41. THOMPSON ET AL., supra note 30, at 63 (“The problem with the DOJ’s proposed reporting
language, then, is that there is no scientific evidence—none whatsoever—that latent print examiners
have the ability to estimate with the required level of precision the frequency of the feature sets
observable in latent prints in the human population. Because there is no proof that they can make such
precise judgments accurately, there is no reason to believe that conclusions resting on their ability to
make such precise judgments will be reliable or valid. Consequently, assertions about the probability
that a feature set observed in a latent print will be repeated in another source are unwarranted. In our
view, latent print examiners should not be making such statements.”); Brandon L. Garrett, Comment on
Proposed
Uniform
Language
for
Testimony
and
Reports
(June
29,
2016),
https://www.regulations.gov/contentStreamer?documentId=DOJ-OLP-2016-00120046&attachmentNumber=1&contentType=pdf [https://perma.cc/7J23-K3EL]; Steve Lund & Hari Iyer,

Published by Reading Room, 2018

9

Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 4 [2018], Art. 7

1112

GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 34:4

II. The Approved ULTR for the Forensic Latent Print Discipline
The newly approved and published ULTR has done little to
address the criticisms above. Below, I discuss several continuing
problems with the approved ULTR.
A. Process Issues
1. Absence of Supporting Documentation
The above criticism notwithstanding, the draft ULTRs were
accompanied
by
longer
documents
titled
Supporting
42
Documentation. These documents enabled greater understanding of
the draft ULTRs’ intended meaning, especially when the ULTRs
were confusing, self-contradictory, or ambiguous. The approved
ULTR for the latent print discipline contains no such supporting
documentation. This makes it more difficult to understand the
ULTR’s intended meaning when, as discussed below, it is unclear,
self-contradictory, or ambiguous. If the latent print ULTR is
establishing a precedent for the others, this does not bode well for
clarity and transparency.
2. Absence of Public Comment (and Failure to Respond to
Original Public Comment)
In announcing the ULTRs (then called ASSTRs), the DOJ stated
that it planned to “invite feedback from the broader forensic
community.” 43 The draft ULTRs were published in the Federal
Register for public comment. 44 There were 127 comments made.45
Comment on Proposed Uniform Language for Testimony and Reports for the Forensic Latent Print
Discipline (July 11, 2016), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=DOJ-OLP-2016-0012-0141
[https://perma.cc/7GMF-3S24]. For more on this issue, see infra Part II.B.2(b).
42. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SUPPORTING DOCUMENTATION FOR DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE PROPOSED
UNIFORM LANGUAGE FOR TESTIMONY AND REPORTS FOR THE FORENSIC LATENT PRINT DISCIPLINE 1
(2016), https://www.justice.gov/archives/olp/file/861906/download [https://perma.cc/P5LN-X72Z].
43. Yates, supra note 7.
44. Notice of Public Comment Period on Proposed Uniform Language for Testimony and Reports,
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The comments on the latent print ULTR raised serious concerns.
While we cannot assume the commenters were always correct, the
process of responding to the public comments would have challenged
the DOJ to consider the criticisms of current practice being made by
the scientific community outside the DOJ.
Public comments on all documents published by the NCFS were
adjudicated.46 The public comments on the draft ULTRs were never
adjudicated. Instead the process was simply restarted, and the
“approved” ULTR was published without public comment. 47 The
DOJ has asserted that the latent print ULTR “was peer-reviewed by
experts outside of the Department, and their comments helped inform
the approved language” through a “National Institute of Justicefacilitated peer review process.” 48 This is less transparent than the
previous ULTR adjudication process.
B. Substantive Issues
1. Categorical Reporting
The ULTR remains a categorical reporting framework with three
categories: identification, inconclusive, and exclusion.49 Categorical
reporting is problematic for the reasons discussed above. 50 The
ULTR offers no explanation as to how it reconciles the well-known
problems with categorical reporting.
As noted above, a categorical framework that includes a category
called identification constitutes a claim to certainty that two prints
81 Fed. Reg. 48462 (July 25, 2016).
45. Notice of Public Comment Period on Proposed Uniform Language for Testimony and Reports,
REGULATIONS.GOV (July 8, 2016),
https://www.regulations.gov/docketBrowser?rpp=25&so=DESC&sb=commentDueDate&po=25&dct=P
S&D=DOJ-OLP-2016-0012 [https://perma.cc/6Y9A-LBDF].
46. NAT’L COMM’N ON FORENSIC SCI., GUIDANCE FOR THE ADJUDICATION OF PUBLIC COMMENTS,
https://www.justice.gov/ncfs/file/788186/download [https://perma.cc/WSR5-N95A] (last updated June
1, 2017).
47. Rosenstein, supra note 18.
48. Id.; Letter from Ted Hunt, Senior Advisor on Forensic Sci., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Jules
Epstein, Professor of Law and Dir. of Advocacy Programs, Temple Univ. Beasley Sch. of Law (Apr. 20,
2018) (on file with Georgia State University Law Review).
49. See DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 2.
50. See supra Part I.B.
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derive from the same source. The ULTR states: “‘Source
identification’ is an examiner’s conclusion that two friction ridge
skin impressions originated from the same source.” 51 Put another
way, identification constitutes a claim that the potential donor pool of
a latent print has been reduced from all the friction ridge skin in the
universe to a single area of skin.
Such strong conclusions have been described as scientifically
unsupportable by numerous authorities, including official reports 52
and scholars. 53 The ULTR proposes that federal latent print
51. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 2.
52. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES 140,
142 (2009); MELISSA K. TAYLOR ET AL., NAT’L INST. STANDARDS & TECH., LATENT PRINT
EXAMINATION AND HUMAN FACTORS: IMPROVING THE PRACTICE THROUGH A SYSTEMS APPROACH 8
(2012); PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., FORENSIC SCIENCE IN CRIMINAL
COURTS: ENSURING SCIENTIFIC VALIDITY OF FEATURE-COMPARISON METHODS 101 (Sept. 2016);
ANTHONY CAMPBELL, THE FINGERPRINT INQUIRY REPORT 740 (2011); THOMPSON ET AL., supra note
30, at 13–16.
53. See, e.g., David A. Stoney, What Made Us Ever Think We Could Individualize Using Statistics?,
31 J. FORENSIC SCI. SOC’Y 197, 197 (1991); Champod & Evett, supra note 25, at 113; Didier Meuwly,
Forensic Individualisation from Biometric Data, 46 SCI. & JUST. 205, 207 (2006); Jennifer L. Mnookin,
The Validity of Latent Fingerprint Identification: Confessions of a Fingerprinting Moderate, 7 L.
PROBABILITY & RISK 127, 131 (2008); Ton Broeders, Of Earprints, Fingerprints, Scent Dogs, Cot
Deaths and Cognitive Contamination—A Brief Look at the Present State of Play in the Forensic Arena,
159 FORENSIC SCI. INT’L 148, 154–55 (2005); see generally Simon A. Cole, Grandfathering Evidence:
Fingerprint Admissibility Rulings from Jennings to Llera Plaza and Back Again, 41 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
1189, 1197 (2004); KEITH INMAN & NORAH RUDIN, PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF CRIMINALISTICS:
THE PROFESSION OF FORENSIC SCIENCE 56 (2000); Bernard W.N. Robertson, Fingerprints, Relevance
and Admissibility, 2 N.Z. RECENT L. REV. 252, 255–56 (1990); Michael J. Saks & Jonathan J. Koehler,
The Individualization Fallacy in Forensic Science Evidence, 61 VAND. L. REV. 199, 204 (2008); Quon
Yin Kwan, Inference of Identity of Source (June 16, 1977) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University
of California, Berkeley) (on file with Georgia State University Law Review); John I. Thornton & Joseph
L. Peterson, The General Assumptions and Rationale of Forensic Identification: Statistical Basis for
Evidence Evaluation, in 4 MOD. SCI. EVIDENCE § 29:46 (David L. Faigman et al. eds., 2017–2018 ed.);
Alex Biedermann et al., Decision Theoretic Properties of Forensic Identification: Underlying Logic and
Argumentative Implications, 177 FORENSIC SCI. INT’L 120, 120–21 (2008) [hereinafter Biedermann,
Decision Theoretic Properties of Forensic Identification]; James E. Starrs, Judicial Control Over
Scientific Supermen: Fingerprint Experts and Others Who Exceed the Bounds, 35 CRIM. L. BULL. 234,
234 (1999); David H. Kaye, Beyond Uniqueness: The Birthday Paradox, Source Attribution and
Individualization in Forensic Science Testimony, 12 L. PROBABILITY & RISK 3, 8–9 (2013); Jonathan
Koehler & Michael J. Saks, Individualization Claims in Forensic Science: Still Unwarranted, 75
BROOK. L. REV. 1187, 1187 (2010); Simon A. Cole, Forensics Without Uniqueness, Conclusions
Without Individualization: The New Epistemology of Forensic Identification, 8 L. PROBABILITY & RISK
233, 234 (2009); Mark Page et al., Uniqueness in the Forensic Identification Sciences—Fact or
Fiction?, 206 FORENSIC SCI. INT’L 12, 13 (2011); Christophe Champod, Fingerprint Examination:
Towards More Transparency, 7 L. PROBABILITY & RISK 111, 111–12 (2008); see D. Michael Risinger
& Michael J. Saks, Science and Nonscience in the Courts: Daubert Meets Handwriting Identification
Expertise, 82 IOWA L. REV. 21, 38 (1996); Max M. Houck, Intellectual Infrastructure: A Modest
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examiners continue to report in terms of certainty, despite these
numerous authorities stating such claims are unsupportable.
2. Basis for a Categorical Report of Source Identification
Given the widespread critiques of categorical reports as
unsupportable, one would expect the ULTR to explain how it claims
to support such a report. The ULTR offers three explanations:
(1) This conclusion is an examiner’s decision that the
observed friction ridge skin features are in sufficient
correspondence such that the examiner would not
expect to see the same arrangement of features
repeated in an impression that came from a different
source and insufficient friction ridge skin features in
disagreement to conclude that the impressions came
from different sources.
(2) The basis for a ‘source identification’ conclusion is
an examiner’s decision that the observed
corresponding friction ridge skin features provide
extremely strong support for the proposition that the
two impressions came from the same source and
extremely weak support for the proposition that the
two impressions came from different sources.
(3) A source identification is a statement of an
examiner’s belief (an inductive inference) that the

Critique of Forensic Science, 53 SCI. & JUST. 1, 1 (2013); Antonio Amorim, Opening the DNA Black
Box: Demythologizing Forensic Genetics, 31 NEW GENETICS & SOC’Y 259, 263–65 (2012); Alex
Biedermann et al., The Subjectivist Interpretation of Probability and the Problem of Individualisation in
Forensic Science, 53 SCI. & JUST. 192, 193–94 (2013) [hereinafter Biedermann, Subjectivist
Interpretation]; Pierre Margot, Forensic Science on Trial—What Is the Law of the Land?, 43
AUSTRALIAN J. FORENSIC SCIS. 89, 95 (2011); Simon A. Cole, Individualization Is Dead, Long Live
Individualization! Reforms of Reporting Practices for Fingerprint Analysis in the United States, 13 L.
PROBABILITY & RISK 117, 117 (2014). See also Letter from Madeline H. deLone, Exec. Dir., Innocence
Project, to Ted Hunt, Senior Forensic Advisor, U.S. Dep’t of Justice and Kira Antell, Senior Counsel,
Office of Legal Policy, U.S. Dep’t of Justice (Mar. 22, 2018) (on file with Georgia State University Law
Review).
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probability that the two impressions were made by
different sources is so small that it is negligible.54
All three statements say more or less the same thing in different
words. In general, they draw on the language of probabilistic
reasoning. Probabilistic approaches have gained increasing influence
within forensic science because they claim to offer a more logical
approach than the sort of nonprobabilistic categorical reporting
described above.55 Forensic statisticians argue that all forensics can
and should be reported in a probabilistic manner.56
As forensic statisticians would advise, the ULTR sets up latent
print analysis as a probabilistic problem that begins with the
formation of two exhaustive and mutually exclusive hypotheses: (1)
the two prints come from the same source; or (2) they come from
different sources. So, the ULTR sets the problem up correctly. Then
it says that the DOJ examiner should report a “source identification”
when the probability of the different source hypothesis is
“negligible,” “extremely weak[ly]” supported, or unexpected.57 The
problem with this approach can be summed up by two key points.
a. Making a Claim to Certainty by Rounding a Small
Probability to a Zero Probability
As noted in the previous section, the ULTR suggests that latent
print examiners report to the fact finder “that two friction ridge skin
impressions originated from the same source.” 58 This statement is
equivalent to reporting to the fact finder that there is zero probability
that two friction ridge impressions originated from different sources.
However, the ULTR then goes on to say that the basis for this
testimony is not that there is zero probability that two friction ridge
54. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 2.
55. See, e.g., COLIN AITKEN & FRANCO TARONI, STATISTICS AND THE EVALUATION OF EVIDENCE
FOR FORENSIC SCIENTSTS 16–17 (2005); BERNARD ROBERTSON ET AL., INTERPRETING EVIDENCE:
EVALUATING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM 55 (2016).
56. See, e.g., AITKEN & TARONI, supra note 55, at 17; ROBERTSON ET AL., supra note 55, at 55.
57. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 2.
58. Id.

https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol34/iss4/7

14

Cole: A Discouraging Omen: A Critical Evaluation of the Approved Unifor

2018]

A DISCOURAGING OMEN

1117

impressions originated from different sources, but rather that this
probability “is so small that it is negligible.”59
This reasoning is problematic for several reasons. First, the ULTR
is self-contradictory. At first, it says that the examiner should report
to the fact finder that there is zero probability that two prints
originate from different sources.60 Then, it states that this probability
is not zero. 61 In short, the ULTR uses probabilistic reasoning to
support a nonprobabilistic statement. This contradicts the whole
rationale of a probabilistic approach, which is to try to understand—
and perhaps quantify—the uncertainty surrounding particular
propositions.
Perhaps the ULTR is saying that the probability is not in fact zero,
but merely that the fact finder should be told that it is zero. In other
words, the ULTR proposes to round a statement of uncertainty into a
statement of certainty for the fact finder’s consumption. What is the
justification for this rounding? Why is it preferable to report the
rounded probability to the fact finder, rather than reporting the “true
probability”? Why is the rounding being done in the direction that
favors the state, rather than the defendant? The ULTR does not
address these questions.
Forensic statisticians take a dim view of this rounding, as we know
from the comments on the draft ULTR.62 Forensic statisticians note
that it “seems sensible to require that probabilities reported by
scientists correspond to their actual personal beliefs.”63 They suggest
“[t]his view can be supported on a number of . . . grounds, including
common sense, ethics, epistemology, and legal requirements that
experts do not testify beyond their realm of expertise.” 64 But they
have also formally demonstrated the intuitive point that reporting the
probability you believe to be accurate is a better decision than
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. See supra Part I.C.; see also Biedermann, Subjectivist Interpretation, supra note 53, at 193
(describing “the malpractice of rounding off small probabilities of actual belief to a zero reported
belief”).
63. Biedermann, Subjectivist Interpretation, supra note 53, at 198.
64. Id.
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reporting a rounded version of that probability. As they dryly note,
“It is thus in the scientist’s interest to report his actual belief.”65
Second, the latent print community had been trying to verbally
characterize the probability that two friction ridge impressions
originated from different sources using words like “negligible,”
“vanishingly small,” “essentially zero,” “minimal,” and
“microscopic” for some years now.66 The questions remain the same
today as they have always been: What quantity is it that is being
verbally characterized as negligible? Why is a word being used rather
than the quantity itself? The answer, of course, is that there is no
quantity. DOJ latent print examiners cannot calculate or estimate the
probability that two friction ridge impressions originated from
different sources, so they are simply declaring it to be extremely
small ipse dixit. The ULTR adopts this argument even though some
progress is being made toward quantifying probabilities for latent
print associations.67 Indeed, one U.S. laboratory, the DFSC, is now
reporting the results of latent print analyses using calculated
probabilities.68 Thus, while the DFSC is actively trying to quantify
probabilities, the DOJ is advising examiners who have not tried to
quantify probabilities to tell the fact finder that they are negligible.
These arguments against rounding probabilities have been in the
literature for some time. The ULTR evinces no awareness of them
and offers no response to them.
b. The ULTR Offers No Evidence That Examiners Can
Determine the Source of a Latent Print with Certainty
The ULTR appears to assume that latent print examiners can
accurately and responsibly determine, estimate, or assign the relative
probability of the evidence under two hypotheses. It does not suggest
or claim they do so through measurements or data. Indeed, it does not
65. Id. at 196.
66. Simon A. Cole, More Than Zero: Accounting for Error in Latent Fingerprint Identification, 95 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 985, 1048 (2007).
67. E.g., Cedric Neumann et al., Quantifying the Weight of Evidence from a Forensic Fingerprint
Comparison: A New Paradigm, 175 J. ROYAL STAT. SOC’Y: SERIES A 371, 372 (2012).
68. DEF. FORENSIC SCI. CTR., supra note 26.
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explain how they reach these probabilities at all. We can assume,
then, they expect examiners to determine these probabilities through
training and experience alone. As the AAAS observed, “there is no
scientific evidence—none whatsoever—that latent print examiners
have the ability to estimate with the required level of precision the
frequency of the feature sets observable in latent prints in the human
population.” 69 Even though the AAAS made these comments in
response to the draft ULTR, 70 the approved ULTR offers no
scientific evidence to refute the AAAS claim about the lack of
scientific evidence.
i. Decision
One odd possible response to the above critique might be that the
ULTR is not actually claiming that examiners have any particular
ability to correctly discern the probability of the evidence if the prints
come from the same source or different sources. After all, the ULTR
says a source identification conclusion is “an examiner’s decision”
about the probability of observing features depending on whether
they come from the same source or different source.71
Decision? The normal English usage of the word decision
connotes free will and choice.72 There is no requirement inherent in
the word that decisions be rational, evidence-based, data-driven,
informed, or well warranted. Any of us can make a good or bad
decision, but we can decide whatever we damn well want. This
contrasts with, for example, the word determination—a word which
was deleted from the draft ULTR73—which does connote that it is
“ascertained, as after observation or investigation,” rather than
merely chosen.74

69. THOMPSON ET AL., supra note 30, at 63. See also Letter from Rush D. Holt, supra note 39.
70. THOMPSON ET AL., supra note 30, at 94.
71. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 2.
72. See Decision, CAMBRIDGE ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2018).
73. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 42, at 12.
74. Determination, DICTIONARY.COM, http://www.dictionary.com/browse/determination?s=t
[https://perma.cc/3CX4-ZJ47] (last visited Mar. 29, 2018).
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Could the ULTR be suggesting that DOJ latent print examiners
can simply decide on the probability of the same source hypothesis
based on a whim with no evidence whatsoever? It seems unlikely that
is what was intended. But why then replace “determination” with
“decision”? The explanation probably lies in the odd recent history of
the use of the word decision in the latent print discipline. Some
explication of that context is necessary.75
Beginning in 2008, a group of forensic scientists and statisticians
published a series of papers advocating the application of decision
theory to forensic identification.76 Although their arguments have by
no means been universally embraced, their influence can be
discerned in the increasingly common characterization of latent print
identifications as “decisions,” rather than as opinions, conclusions, or
determinations.77 This trend culminated with the Scientific Working
Group on Friction Ridge Analysis and Technology (SWGFAST)
replacing the word conclusion with the word decision in 2011. 78
Since then, it has become unsurprising, if not altogether common, to
hear reference to “identification decisions” regarding latent prints.
It is difficult to avoid thinking that the ULTR’s use of the word
decision represents a desire to join this trend. But what is striking is
how different the ULTR’s use of the word decision is from the
word’s use in decision theory and even from the SWGFAST’s usage.
In decision theory, the decision is the end-point of the reasoning
process.79 The SWGFAST defined identification as a “decision.”80 In
75. See Biedermann, Decision Theoretic Properties of Forensic Identification, supra note 53, at 130.
For greater detail, see Cole, Individualization Is Dead, Long Live Individualization! Reforms of
Reporting Practices for Fingerprint Analysis in the United States, supra note 53.
76. See Biedermann, Decision Theoretic Properties of Forensic Identification, supra note 53, at 121.
See also Alex Biedermann et al., The Decisionalization of Individualization, 266 FORENSIC SCI. INT’L
29, 29–38 (2016).
77. See Biedermann, Decision Theoretic Properties of Forensic Identification, supra note 53, at
120–21.
78. SWGFAST, supra note 19, at § 4.3.2.1.
79. The following, in lay terms, is how decision theory is supposed to work. The final stage of a
forensic analysis is a decision—that is, not an arrival at some sort of definitive truth, but, rather, a
decision to behave as if one or the other version of events is the truth. For example, one might decide to
behave as if it will rain, and bring one’s umbrella, or one might decide to behave as if it will not rain and
leave one’s at umbrella home. Likewise, one might decide to behave as if the defendant is guilty and
execute him, or one might decide to behave as if he is innocent and set him free amongst us. In both
cases, we do not know the truth, but we must (eventually) behave as if we do. Decision theory is a
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the ULTR, the conclusion is the end-point of the reasoning process.
Decisions are treated as the “basis” of that conclusion.81 It is unclear
what this is supposed to mean. The word decision is used in the
ULTR where one would expect to see a word like perhaps
measurement, analysis, estimate, reasoning, argument, data, or
evidence. For example, the ULTR suggests that an important
question is whether “the observed friction ridge skin features are in
sufficient correspondence such that the examiner would not expect to
see the same arrangement of features repeated in an impression that
came from a different source.”82 But the ULTR does not suggest that
the examiner determine this, assess it, measure it, or analyze it.
Rather, it suggests the examiner “decide” it.83 But, as noted above, a
decision (in the vernacular sense) can be entirely a matter of will or
preference and requires no rational or evidential basis.
In this sense, the ULTR is entirely inconsistent with decision
theory and indeed with any system of reasoning that makes any
sense. It suggests that examiners make a series of “decisions” about
probabilities and then base a categorical conclusion on those
decisions. This essentially turns decision theory on its head. Decision
theory is intended to be a way to use a series of probabilities—which
are reached through some sort of calculations and/or reasoning
process—to make a final “decision” about how to behave under
conditions of uncertainty.84 The ULTR proposes to make a series of

framework for choosing one of these two behaviors by weighing both: (1) the probabilities of being
right or wrong (i.e., about it raining or it not raining); and (2) the consequences of right and wrong
decisions (e.g., getting wet or unnecessarily carrying one’s umbrella).
The point, as applied to forensic problems, was that the desired end-points—same source or different
source—were not determinations or even conclusions but decisions. One can never know for sure
whether two prints are in fact from the same source or different source. But one can—and sometimes
must—decide to behave as if one or the other is true. And, importantly, the decision must necessarily be
informed not merely by the risk of error but also by the decision-maker’s preferences regarding the
consequences of error. Biedermann, Decision Theoretic Properties of Forensic Identification, supra
note 53, at 121.
80. SWGFAST, supra note 19, at § 4.3.2.1.
81. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 2.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Biedermann, Decision Theoretic Properties of Forensic Identification, supra note 53, at 121–22.
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decisions about probabilities and use them to make a categorical
conclusion.
The final irony is that the decision theory papers in forensic
statistics were intended to demonstrate why forensic examiners
should not report categorical conclusions such as, for example: “these
two prints came from the same source.” Decision theorists argue that
reporting a categorical conclusion requires that some judgment be
made—even if only implicitly—about the decision-maker’s
preferences regarding the consequences of the available decisions.85
Since it is not the expert’s place to impose her preferences upon
either the fact-finder or society as a whole, the expert cannot proceed
to make the final decision without inquiring into the preferences of
the fact-finder or society. This is yet another reason why categorical
reports by forensic experts are ill-advised. If the ULTR is, in its use
of the term decision, trying to invoke decision theory to support its
advocacy for categorical reporting, that would be enrolling decision
theory in a project which it intended to oppose.
In short, if decision is meant in a purely vernacular sense, then the
ULTR is taking the curious position that latent print source
identification conclusions are simply expressions of will or choice on
the part of DOJ examiners. If, on the other hand, decision is intended
to invoke the technical concept called decision theory, then the
ULTR has misused the term.
3. False Concessions
The ULTR ends with a section devoted to “Qualifications and
Limitations of Latent Print Comparison Conclusions.”86 The section
lists five things that DOJ latent print examiners should not say.87 It is
useful to have these statements on record because, in some cases,
these are statements that the DOJ did say for many years. For
example, the ULTR says that DOJ examiners should not say latent

85. Id. at 120.
86. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 2–3.
87. Id.
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print examination “has a zero error rate” or is 100% certain.88 This is
important because FBI latent print examiners did say both of those
things for many years. 89 Most significantly, they said them in the
early admissibility hearings challenging latent print evidence under
Daubert.90 Essentially, the entire structure of precedents supporting
the admissibility of latent print evidence under Daubert rests upon
this now-disavowed claim.
While this list of “no-nos” does demonstrate progress in the DOJ’s
thinking, to some extent the DOJ is merely ratifying decisions that
have already been made by others. The International Association for
Identification, the leading professional organization for identification
professionals, banned claims of “zero error rate,” 100% certainty, and
infallibility nine years ago.91 But the more important issue is that this
section consists of what I would call false concessions. By this I
mean that the prohibition of these statements gives an appearance of
progress, of compromise, of meeting forensic statisticians halfway.
But that appearance is false because, in fact, prohibiting the five
forbidden statements leaves the examiner’s report logically
unchanged.
a. TTEOAOS
Perhaps the most egregious of these false concessions is the
provision that DOJ examiners “not assert that two friction ridge
impressions originated from the same source to the exclusion of all
other sources.”92 As noted above, the ULTR has already stated that
examiners should assert “that two friction ridge skin impressions
originated from the same source.”93 We can deduce, then, that the
ULTR is merely objecting to the seven words: “to the exclusion of all
88. Id. at 3.
89. Cole, supra note 66, at 1034–35.
90. E.g., United States v. Havvard, 117 F. Supp. 2d 848, 854 (S.D. Ind. 2000) (describing the
“breathtaking” claim that the error rate is zero).
91. Memorandum from Robert J. Garrett, President, Int’l Ass’n for Identification (IAI), to the IAI
Members
(Feb.
19,
2009),
https://www.theiai.org/current_affairs/nas_memo_20090219.pdf
[https://perma.cc/YB3H-96T4].
92. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 2.
93. Id.
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other sources” (TTEOAOS). However, there is no logical difference
between the following two statements: (1) the defendant is the source
of the print, and (2) the defendant is the source of the print
TTEOAOS. Thus, this is a false concession because it appears to
reform forensic science by prohibiting a “bad” phrase, but it in fact
leaves the report to the fact-finder logically unchanged.
This argument was made in response to the draft ULTR. As the
OSAC Friction Ridge Subcommittee public comment noted:
Other commentators have already noted that the mere
removal of the words “to the exclusion of all others” does
not remove their implication and that the implication is
inappropriate. If a statement is made that “two friction
ridge prints originated from the same source,” then de
facto, they could not have been made by any other source.
By using the exact same language in the proposed
allowable language and unallowable language with the
exception of those few words, unnecessary confusion may
be introduced, as the two phrases say the exact same thing,
with the exception that in one the exclusion of all others is
explicitly stated, and in the other, it is merely implied.94
The ULTR evinces no awareness of this argument and offers no
response to it. Instead, the ULTR appears to justify the distinction
between saying “same source” with or without TTEOAOS with the
argument that TTEOAOS “may wrongly imply that a source
identification is based upon a statistically-derived or verified
measurement or comparison of all friction ridge skin impression
features in the world’s population, rather than an examiner’s expert
conclusion.” 95 It is unclear why the ULTR holds that TTEOAOS
implies this statement in a way that “same source” does not.96
94. Friction Ridge Subcomm. of the Organization of Sci. Area Comms., supra note 36, at 1–2.
95. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 2.
96. Id. In fact, the ULTR is unclear whether it intends this statement to apply to TTEOAOS or to
“individualization” or to both. The ULTR prohibits both TTEOAOS and the term “individualization”
and then says, “[t]his may wrongly imply that a source identification is based upon a statistically-
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b. 100% Certainty
The same may be said for banning the term 100% certainty. The
ULTR advocates that DOJ examiners report: two prints come from
the same source.97 But it bans them from reporting: two prints come
from the same source with 100% certainty. 98 But what is the
difference?
c. Individualization
The same may be said about the ULTR banning the term
individualization. Again, it appears that the ULTR is reforming
forensic science by banning a bad phrase. But the UTLR advocates
the use of the term identification. 99 Left unsaid is the fact that
individualization and identification mean exactly the same thing in
the latent print discipline and in forensic science generally. 100 As
previously discussed, individualization and identification are treated
as synonyms in numerous SWGFAST documents.101 It is true that
some in the latent print community have tried to distinguish the terms
and assign identification a new meaning, which is essentially “near
certainty that someone is the source of a latent print.”102 As has been
derived or verified measurement or comparison of all friction ridge skin impression features in the
world’s population, rather than an examiner’s expert conclusion.” Id. In any case, the statement is no
more plausible an explanation of how individualization differs from identification than it is for how
same source with “to the exclusion of all others” differs from same source without it. See discussion
infra Part II.B.3(c).
97. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 2.
98. Id. at 3.
99. Id. at 2.
100. See Cole, Individualization Is Dead, Long Live Individualization! Reforms of Reporting
Practices for Fingerprint Analysis in the United States, supra note 53, at 117. See also Letter from
Madeline H. deLone, supra note 53.
101. SCI. WORKING GRP. ON FRICTION RIDGE ANALYSIS STUDY & TECH., FRICTION RIDGE
EXAMINATION METHODOLOGY FOR LATENT PRINT EXAMINERS § 3.3.1 (Aug. 22, 2002),
http://clpex.com/swgfast/documents/methodology/100506-Methodology-Reformatted-1.01Archived.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y5AN-285H]; SCI. WORKING GRP. ON FRICTION RIDGE ANALYSIS
STUDY & TECH, GLOSSARY 10–12 (Sept. 9, 2003),
http://www.clpex.com/swgfast/documents/glossary/030909_Glossary-Consolidated_ver_1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/WWZ4-UJWK]; SCI. WORKING GRP. ON FRICTION RIDGE ANALYSIS STUDY & TECH.,
STANDARDS FOR CONCLUSIONS § 1 (Sept. 11, 2003),
http://clpex.com/swgfast/documents/conclusions/030911_Standards_Conclusions_1.0-Archived.pdf
[https://perma.cc/DTK9-XZMR].
102. See Cole, Individualization Is Dead, Long Live Individualization! Reforms of Reporting
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noted, however, the problem with such efforts is that the word
identification has a plain English meaning plus decades of use in
forensic science to mean same source.103 Neither the discipline nor
the DOJ can credibly attempt to simply assign new meaning to a
word and expect the word to be understood that way by fact-finders
or by practitioners.104
If the reader still has any residual uncertainty about whether the
word identification does mean the reduction of the potential donor
pool to a single source in the forensic community, they need only
look to an article freshly published by the DOJ itself. The authors,
including the Director of the National Institute of Justice Office of
Investigative and Forensic Services, write that when forensic
examiners “mean that the items being compared share a common
source . . . the examiner will typically assert that he or she has
‘identified’ a questioned item as originating from a known source.”105
Similarly, the newly posted OSAC Lexicon defines identification,
regarding the friction ridge discipline, as follows: “See
individualization.”106 Individualization, in turn, is defined as “[t]he
determination by an examiner that there is sufficient quality and
quantity of detail in agreement to conclude that two friction ridge
impressions originated from the same source.” 107 Finally, as an
anecdotal illustration of the state-of-the-art in forensic practice,
consider the standard operating procedure of the latent print unit of
the largest police department in the United States, the New York
Police Department, which gives identical definitions for
identification and individualization.108
Practices for Fingerprint Analysis in the United States, supra note 53, at 117.
103. Henry J. Swofford & Jessica Gabel Cino, Lay Understanding of ‘Identification’: How Jurors
Interpret Forensic Identification Testimony, 68 J. FORENSIC IDENTIFICATION 29, 31 (2018).
104. TAYLOR ET AL., supra note 52, at 73.
105. Danielle Weiss & Gerald LaPorte, Uncertainty Ahead: A Shift in How Federal Scientific Experts
Can Testify, 279 NAT’L INST. JUST. J. (2018), https://www.nij.gov/journals/279/Pages/a-shift-in-howfederal-scientific-experts-can-testify.aspx [https://perma.cc/E573-CRDW].
106. SCI. WORKING GRP. ON FRICTION RIDGE ANALYSIS STUDY & TECH., DOC. NO. 19, STANDARD
TERMINOLOGY OF FRICTION RIDGE EXAMINATION (LATENT/TENPRINT) 5 (Mar. 14, 2013),
http://clpex.com/swgfast/documents/terminology/121124_Standard-Terminology_4.0.pdf
[https://perma.cc/48RU-PTJL].
107. Id.
108. N.Y. POLICE DEP’T, LATENT PRINT SECTION STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES MANUAL,
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Therefore, banning the word individualization is another false
concession. One word is banned, but another word, with the same
meaning, is still permitted. And, that word is still defined as “same
source.”109
The argument that individualization is synonymous with
identification has been in the literature for some time.110 The ULTR
evinces no awareness of it and offers no response to it, other than the
statement about verified measurement noted above.111
CONCLUSION
In this Symposium, we were asked to reflect upon the future of
forensic science reform. The latent print discipline is an important—
and iconic—forensic discipline, and the ULTR is an important—and
long-awaited—document. The approved ULTR is disappointing in
the degree to which it moves the latent print discipline in the United
States forward. It retains categorical reporting. At the same time, it
seems to contradict itself by elsewhere suggesting that source
identification conclusions are somewhat less than categorical. It
retains the word identification which clearly connotes categorical
reporting, while simultaneously resurrecting the tired strategy of
trying to redefine the word by fiat to make its use less logically
objectionable. It proposes that DOJ examiners estimate the rarity of
arrangements of friction ridges in order to assign probabilities absent
any evidence that that they can do any such thing. It proposes to rest
a nonprobabilistic conclusion on probabilistic reasoning, and it
proposes to rest a “conclusion” on a series of “decisions.” Finally, in
its false concessions, it dangerously perpetuates within the latent
print community the misleading notion that categorical reporting is
perfectly acceptable as long as certain prohibited statements like
PROCEDURE #24: DEFINITIONS 4 (July 10, 2015) (on file with the Georgia State University Law
Review). The common definition is: “The determination of an examiner that there is sufficient quality
and quantity of detail in agreement to conclude that two friction ridge impressions originated from the
same source.” Id.
109. See DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 2.
110. See Friction Ridge Subcomm. of the Organization of Sci. Area Comms., supra note 36.
111. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
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individualization, zero error rate, 100% certainty, and TTEOAOS are
not uttered.
The disappointment, however, extends beyond the latent print
discipline. This is because the DOJ itself announced that the ULTRs
“will serve as a model for demonstrating our commitment to
strengthening forensic science, now and in the future.” 112 The
approved latent print ULTR is the product of the entity which has
now taken the place in American forensic science once occupied by
the NCFS. It is among the first documents issued by that entity. As
such, it may be a harbinger of what is to come in terms of the future
of forensic science reform. In that context, the flaws in this
document—its vagueness and ambiguity, its casual use of language,
its self-contradiction, its continued perpetuation of claims to
certainty, and its indifference to probability and uncertainty—may
have implications for the future of forensic science reform far beyond
a single document and a single discipline.

112. Yates, supra note 7.
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